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The last two decades have witnessed an astonishing increase in the use of the 
criminal justice system to police neglectful parents. Recasting traditional allegations 
of neglect as criminal charges of endangering the welfare of a child, prosecutors and 
the police have involved criminal courts in the regulation of aspects of the parent-
child relationship that were once the sole province of family courts. This Article 
explores the legal implications of vesting judges in these cases with the unfettered 
discretion to issue protective orders that criminalize contact between a parent and her 
child. I argue that procedures for issuing protective orders that were once justified by 
the challenges of fighting domestic violence cannot constitutionally be applied to 
parents charged with criminal neglect. Instead, criminal courts and legislatures 
should look to family court, the forum traditionally empowered to police neglectful 
parents, for guidance on how to properly intervene on behalf of neglected children. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Nobody suggested that a model parent would pass out drunk in a taxi at 2:00 a.m. 
with her two young children awake beside her. 1 What was surprising was the two New 
York City police officers' response to the situation. They could have taken custody of 
the children and notified the Administration for Children's Services (ACS) to institute 
temporary removal proceedings to protect the children from "imminent danger."2 Had 
they done so, the mother would have been afforded an array of constitutional 
protections to ensure that the state, in its effort to protect the children, did not 
needlessly interfere with her constitutional right to the "companionship, care, custody, 
and management"3 of her children. 
Instead, the police officers chose to arrest the mother and charge her with a crime. 
As a result, she spent the night in a precinct lockup before being transported to 
criminal court to be arraigned on a misdemeanor charge of"endangering the welfare of 
a child.'o4 At the arraignment, the judge, at the behest of the prosecutor, issued a full 
I. Criminal procedure and the idiosyncrasies of criminal practice vary widely from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The constitutional issues surrounding parent defendants are common 
across states and localities, but they may manifest themselves in decidedly different ways. Not 
only does each state have its own criminal procedure, but individual jurisdictions (and 
individual judges) have their own practices. While I have attempted to provide examples across 
jurisdictions, I have chosen to focus on New York City to provide context and examples in this 
article. I do not mean to suggest, however, that New York is the only state that has failed to 
adequately incorporate due process protection for parents in its criminal procedure. On the 
contrary, the failure to protect parents when orders of protection are issued appears to be a 
widespread phenomenon. See Christopher R. Frank, Comment, Criminal Protection Orders in 
Domestic Violence Cases: Getting Rid of Rats with Snakes, 50 U. MIAMI L. REv. 919, 936 
(1996) (noting that criminal courts in many states disregard hearing requirements when they 
issue orders of protection). 
The story of the mother in the taxi is a real one. Before entering academia, the author 
represented a mother of two young children in just such a case. The mother was arraigned in 
early 2006 in Bronx Criminal Court, and it took over nine months to resolve her case. 
Consistent with the racial pattern associated with the criminal prosecution of neglectful parents, 
see infra Part II, the defendant mother was poor, single, and black. 
2. SeeN.Y.FAM.CT.ACT§ 1024(McKinney2010). 
3. Stanleyv. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,651 (1972)("It is plain that the interest of a parent in 
the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children comes to this Court 
with a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from 
shifting economic arrangements." (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
4. A person is guilty of endangering the welfare of a child when: 
I. He knowingly acts in a manner likely to be injurious to the physical, mental or 
moral welfare of a child less than seventeen years old or directs or authorizes such 
child to engage in an occupation involving a substantial risk of danger to his life or 
health; or 
2. Being a parent, guardian or other person legally charged with the care or 
custody of a child less than eighteen years old, he fails or refuses to exercise 
reasonable diligence in the control of such child to prevent him from becoming an 
"abused child," a "neglected child," a ·~uvenile delinquent" or a "person in need 
of supervision," as those terms are defined in articles ten, three and seven of the 
family court act. 
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temporary order of protection5 barring the mother from any contact with her children. 
The prosecutor's request was subject to no burden of proof; the judge's decision 
required no fmdings offact. The mother was offered no opportunity to call or examine 
a witness or to testify as to her own actions. Indeed, the issuance of the order reflected 
the standard practice in criminal court of requiring defendants to stay away from the 
alleged victims of their crimes. Despite the glaring absence of any procedural 
protections and no adjudication of guilt whatsoever, the mother's right to associate 
with her child was abrogated for the life of the criminal case.6 
The last two decades have witnessed an astonishing increase in the use of the 
criminal justice system to police neglectful parents. 7 Recasting traditional allegations 
of neglect as criminal charges of endangering the welfare of a child, 8 prosecutors and 
the police have introduced a new kind of defendant into the criminal system bearing a 
new set of constitutionally protected liberty interests. The right of a parent to the 
company and custody of her child is "perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty 
interests recognized by [the Supreme] Court."9 Civil courts have long held that state 
officials cannot separate children from their families, even temporarily, without 
providing due process oflaw.10 Yet, while family courts11 recognize the constraints of 
N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 260.10 (McKinney 2008). 
Because the crime of Endangering the Welfare of a Child incorporates by reference the 
definition of"neglect" from the New York Family Court Act, acts sufficient to establish a civil 
neglect case are also sufficient to establish a crime under New York Penal Law § 260.10. See 
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT§ 1012 (McKinney 2009); N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 260.10 (McKinney 2008); 
People v. Carroll, 715 N.E.2d 500, 502 (N.Y. 1999); Alison B. Vreeland, Note, The 
Criminalization of Child Welfare in New York City: Sparing the Child or Spoiling the Family?, 
27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1053, 1068 (2000). 
5. "The name given to these types of orders varies among jurisdictions. They are also 
known as restraining orders, stay-away orders, no-contact orders, ... and protective orders." 
Emily J. Sack, Domestic Violence Across State Lines: The Full Faith and Credit Clause, 
Congressional Power, and Interstate Enforcement of Protection Orders, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 827, 
833 n.l6 (2004) (citing FRED RICA L. LEHRMAN, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 4:1 (1996)). 
6. Criminal court judges often include a provision in the order of protection that allows a 
family court judge to modifY the order if parallel charges are brought by ACS in family court. 
This occurred in the actual case upon which this fact pattern is modeled, and the family court 
ultimately allowed the mother to have contact with her children. The modification of the order 
of protection, however, took several weeks. See infra Part I(E). 
7. This Article addresses the arrest and criminal prosecution of parents only for acts that 
constitute neglect as opposed to physical abuse or other cognizable criminal charges. Typical 
neglect allegations include leaving a young child unattended, maintaining unsanitary home 
conditions, or failing to assure that a child attends school. Vreeland, supra note 4, at 1061. 
8. See sources cited supra note 4. 
9. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). 
10. See Gomes v. Wood, 451 F.3d 1122, 1127 (lOth Cir. 2006) ("[S]tate officials may not 
remove children from the home, through either temporary seizures or the permanent termination 
of parental rights, without providing due process oflaw."); Southerland v. Giuliani, 4 F. App'x 
33, 36 (2d Cir. 2001) ("We have never required ... that parental rights be completely or 
permanently terminated in order for constitutional protections to apply."); Wallis v. Spencer, 
202 F.3d 1126, 1136 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, for the 
proposition that parents and children have a right to live together without governmental 
interference); Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 594 (2d Cir. 1999); Hollingsworth v. Hill, 
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the Fourteenth Amendment, 12 criminal courts forcibly separate neglectful parents from 
their children as a matter of routine policy. 13 
The expansion of the criminal court's jurisdiction to police neglectful parents is 
consistent with the ever-expanding nature of the criminal law, which "tends to seek 
new frontiers of liability and to bring into its ambit areas of life previously not 
regulated by it. " 14 Yet while the evolution of criminal law tends to push in the direction 
of broader liability, 15 it is also rigid in its adherence to established procedure and 
practice. Existing pretrial procedures that allow for the issuance of protective orders to 
separate assailants from their alleged victims were designed to accommodate the needs 
of domestic violence victims and were fashioned to overcome the criminal justice 
system's historic refusal to protect battered women.16 Statutes authorizing protective 
110 F.3d 733, 738-39 (lOth Cir. 1997); Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 237 
(E.D.N.Y. 2002) ("[E]ven temporary removals by the state threaten the familial association 
interests of parents, and thus must satisfy requirements of procedural due process."); Strail ex 
rei. Strail v. Dep'tofChildren, Youth & FamiliesofR.I., 62 F. Supp. 2d519, 526 (D.R.I. 1999) 
("[T]he Supreme Court has afforded protection against temporary deprivations in the parent-
child relationship as part of the right to familial integrity."). 
11. I use the term "family court" to connote those civil courts that traditionally have had 
jurisdiction to police child welfare. Such courts are also known as juvenile courts, domestic 
relations courts, dependency courts, and children's courts. See Jane M. Spinak, Romancing the 
Court, 46 FAM. CT. REv. 258, 271 n.1 (2008). 
12. See Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816,862-63 
(1977) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("If a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural 
family, over the objections of the parents and their children, without some showing of unfitness 
and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the children's best interest, I should 
have little doubt that the State would have intruded impermissibly on 'the private realm of 
family life which the state cannot enter."' (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 
(1944))). 
13. To date, no court appears to have addressed the constitutionality of vesting criminal 
court judges with the discretion to issue orders of protection that abrogate a parent's right to 
care for her child. There have been cases in which defendants have challenged orders of 
protection on the grounds that such orders constitute de facto evictions which deprive 
defendants of a property interest without due process oflaw. Compare, e.g., People v. Forman, 
546 N.Y.S.2d 755 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1989) (finding that defendants have a right to a hearing to 
challenge orders of protection), with People v. Koertge, 701 N.Y.S.2d 588 (Nassau County Dist. 
Ct. 1998) (refusing to fmd any right to a hearing challenging a protective order). However, in 
addition to ignoring the more substantive right to care for one's child, those "property cases" 
focused only on the defendant's right to a hearing. The evidentiary standard for issuing the order 
was not addressed. See, e.g., Forman, 546 N.Y.S.2d at 759 n.1 (declining to identify the 
evidentiary standard required under the Fourteenth Amendment to support defendant's 
continued exclusion from his home). 
14. JEANNIE SUK, AT HOME IN TilE LAW: HOW TilE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REVOLUTION Is 
TRANSFORMING PRN ACY 9 (2009). 
15. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REv. 505, 
507 (2001) ("Since all change in criminal law seems to push in the same direction-toward 
more liability-this state of affairs is growing worse: legislatures regularly add to criminal 
codes, but rarely subtract from them."). 
16. See infra Part I.B; see also Deborah Epstein, Procedural Justice: Tempering the State's 
Response to Domestic Violence, 43 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1843, 1873 (2002) (describing the 
history of domestic violence reforms in the criminal and civil justice system and the 
"accompanying reduction in procedural protections for perpetrators"). 
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orders were designed without procedural protections for defendants in a conscious 
effort to encourage reluctant judges to intervene and protect battered women. 17 As the 
practice of issuing protective orders evolved to include new crimes, this lack of 
procedural protections has had an unforeseen impact on defendant parents charged 
with neglect. Moreover, the demographics of arrest for endangering the welfare of a 
child reflect the discriminatory patterns of the child welfare system as a whole: 
defendants tend to be disproportionately poor, female, and black.18 It is a bitter irony 
that a tool designed to liberate women from abusive circumstances is routinely used to 
deny women of color the "intrinsic human rights"19 that the Fourteenth Amendment 
was designed to secure. 
This Article argues that the procedures for issuing orders of protections that were 
once justified by the challenges of fighting domestic violence cannot constitutionally 
be applied to parents charged with criminal neglect. Instead, criminal courts and 
legislatures should look to family court, the forum traditionally empowered to police 
neglectful parents, for guidance on how to properly intervene on behalf of neglected 
children. 
Using New York City as a primary example, Part I of this article describes how 
domestic violence concerns influenced the development of the order of protection as it 
evolved from a narrowly tailored family court remedy for spousal abuse to a ubiquitous 
criminal court decree used to separate a wide variety of defendants from the alleged 
victims of their crimes. Part II describes the rising incidence of state actors using the 
criminal justice system to police child neglect and its disproportionate impact on poor 
women of color. Part III examines the constitutionality of procedures that vest absolute 
discretion in judges to bar parents from seeing their children. Finally, Part IV suggests 
that criminal courts should look to family court to develop standards that allow courts 
to intervene responsibly to protect children without violating the right of parents to 
care for their children. 
I. THE EVOLUTION OF ORDERS OF PROTECTION 
Criminal courts did not always have the statutory authority to issue orders of 
protection. In fact, while orders of protection have existed in one form or another for 
centuries, the modern-day statutes authorizing judges to issue protective orders were 
initially developed for civil courts to protect married women from abusive husbands.20 
17. See infra Part l.C; see also Epstein, supra note 16, at 1851 ("Given the long legacy of 
state protection of and deference to those who abuse their intimate partners, it is hardly 
surprising that promoting procedural fairness for batterers was of little interest to activists, 
academics, and policymakers. Instead, these groups focused on improving and expanding the 
justice system's responsiveness to victims in need of protection. Although there was no 
conscious strategic decision to target and reduce batterers' sense of fair and respectful treatment 
by authorities, many of the movement's most successful reforms, both individually and taken as 
a whole, have had precisely that impact"). 
18. See infra Part II. 
19. Smith v. Org. ofFosterFamilies for Equal. &Reform,431 U.S. 816,845 (1977)(citing 
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)). 
20. Ruth Colker, Marriage Mimicry: The Law of Domestic Violence, 4 7 WM. & MARY L. 
REv. 1841, 1844-45 (2006) ("Legislatures first began to provide legal recourse to married 
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Today, protective orders have become a procedural default in criminal court, largely 
divorced from the liberating principles that initially catalyzed their growth. However, 
judicial attitudes about orders of protection, as well as the procedures that govern their 
issuance, have been profoundly influenced by the modem protective order's roots in 
the fight against domestic abuse. 
A. Orders of Protection as a Weapon Against Domestic Violence 
Orders of protection were not always associated with the fight against domestic 
abuse. Courts have used protective injunctions for centuries to regulate citizens' 
behavior.21 Blackstone traced the use of"peace bonds," an early form of protective 
injunction, back to Alfred the Great, the Anglo-Saxon King of Wessex, who, "to 
prevent rapine and disorders," required families to act as sureties for one another as a 
means of "preventative justice."22 In the late seventeenth and early eighteenth 
centuries, several American colonies, particularly the Quaker government in 
Pennsylvania, made extensive use of"peace bonds" to regulate the behavior of their 
citizens.Z3 Such bonds were issued to ensure the good behavior of feuding neighbors,24 
alleged thieves, 25 and even a witch accused of casting spells on cattle?6 
This is not to suggest that protective injunctions were never used to police domestic 
violence. In seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England, victims of domestic abuse 
could seek "articles of peace" from the local magistrate.27 Ifthe magistrate accepted 
the wife's account of abuse, her husband could be ordered to enter a "recognizance" 28 
obliging him to refrain from further abuse or risk losing a significant amount of money 
women who were victims of domestic violence in the 1970s and 1980s through the development 
of warrantless arrest statutes, the availability of civil protection orders, and the funding of 
battered women's shelters."). 
21. See R. EMERSON DOBASH & RUSSELL DOBASH, VIOLENCE AGAINST WIVES: A CASE 
AGAINST THE PATRIARCHY 220 (1979). 
22. I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *114; 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *251. 
23. Paul Lermack, Peace Bonds and Criminal Justice in Colonial Philadelphia, 100 PA. 
MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 173, 174 (1976); see also David H. Flaherty, Crime and Social 
Control in Provincial Massachusetts, 24 HIST. J. 339, 351 (1981) (discussing imposition of 
"bonds for good behaviour" in colonial Massachusetts, including upon acquitted persons); 
Kathryn Preyer, Penal Measures in the American Colonies: An Overview, 26 AM. J. LEGALHIST. 
326, 336-37 (1982) (discussing the use of peace bonds in several colonies including 
Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and New Haven). 
24. Lermack, supra note 23, at 176. 
25. !d. at 187. 
26. !d. at 177. 
27. ELIZABETHFOYSTER, MARITAL VIOLENCE:ANENGLISHFAMILYHlsTORY, 1660-1857, at 
22 (2005); see also Jennine Hurl-Eamon, Domestic Violence Prosecuted: Women Binding over 
Their Husbands for Assault at Westminster Quarter Sessions, 1685-1720, 26 J. F AM. HIST. 435, 
436 (2001). 
28. According to Blackstone, "A recognizance is an obligation of record, which a man 
enters into before some court of record or magistrate duly authorized, with condition to do some 
particular act; as to appear at the assizes, to keep the peace, to pay a debt, or the like." 
ABRIDGMENT OF BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 217 (William C. Sprague ed., 1893). 
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or even jail time (ifhe had insufficient funds). 29 However, while injunctions to keep the 
peace were successfully utilized in some circumstances to protect wives from further 
abuse, such injunctions were, at best, a shield against particularly violent behavior, not 
a means to politically empower women.30 
As the domestic violence movement coalesced in the 1970s, advocates focused on 
legal reforms aimed to "assert battered women's right to be free from violence."31 It 
was at this time that advocates identified the potential for injunctive relief to radically 
alter the balance of power between abusers and their victims. 32 Legislation authorizing 
the issuance of orders of protection on behalf of battered women was championed as a 
key aspect oflarger efforts to expand women's autonomy and independence.33 While 
orders of protection had existed in various forms for centuries, the roots ofthe modem 
protective order lie in the statutes passed in the 1970s that focused exclusively on 
issues related to domestic violence. Moreover, the advocates and legislators who 
drafted those statutes were keenly aware of the difficulties battered women faced when 
they sought help from the criminal justice system. These concerns played an important 
role in limiting the procedural protections the courts ultimately afforded defendants. 
B. The Criminal Justice System's Historic Failure to Protect Battered Women 
In the 1970s, the criminal justice system's refusal to intervene to protect battered 
women was pervasive. 34 Police routinely declined to arrest abusers; prosecutors balked 
at pursuing criminal charges; and judges refused to intervene in private "family 
matter[ s]," instead directing the parties to work things out for themselves. 35 A judge's 
suggestions to a victim and her batterer that the two should "kiss and make up and get 
29. FoYSTER, supra note 27, at 22-23; see also Hurl-Eamon, supra note 27, at 436. 
30. See Hurl-Eamon, supra note 27, at 436, 450 (noting that the legal protections against 
male spousal violence served to further, not to challenge, the legitimacy of patriarchal power). 
31. ELIZABETII M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING 44 (2000); see 
also Patricia E. Erwin, Exporting U.S. Domestic Violence Reforms: An Analysis of Human 
Rights Frameworks and U.S. "Best Practices," 1 FEMINIST CRIMINOLOGY 188, 191-92 (2006). 
32. Barbara J. Hart, Civil Protection Orders, Juv. & FAM. CT. J., Nov. 1992, at 5, 23. 
33. /d. ("A new remedy was needed. One that would enjoin the perpetrator from future 
abuse. One that would not displace the abused woman from her home but could compel 
relocation of the abuser .... One that would advance the autonomy and independence ofthe 
battered woman from the abuser. Civil protection orders were this new remedy."). 
34. G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided: Mandatory A"est, Domestic Violence, and the 
Conservatization of the Battered Women's Movement, 42 Hous. L. REv. 237,278 (2005) 
("Police and prosecutorial failure to adequately enforce laws was contextualized within a 
cultural and systemic failure to protect battered women's rights and lives."). 
35. Sally F. Goldfarb, Reconceiving Civil Protection Orders for Domestic Violence: Can 
Law Help End the Abuse Without Ending the Relationship?, 29 CARDOZO L. REv. 1487, 1494 
(2008); see also Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: 
Rethinking the Roles of Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, 2 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3, 
4 (1999) ("It has long been common practice for police to refuse to arrest, for prosecutors to 
decline to press charges, and for judges to be reluctant to issue civil protection orders or impose 
meaningful sentences on batterers. Overall, the system's response to domestic violence has been 
unresponsive and oriented toward non-enforcement."). 
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out of my court"36 underscored the barriers that battered women faced when they 
sought help from the criminal courts. Domestic violence advocates recognized that the 
introduction oflegal tools like protective orders would ultimately prove ineffective if 
they failed to challenge the criminal justice system's failure to recognize and respond 
to domestic violence. 37 
Advocates sought to confront the criminal system's failure to protect women with a 
combined strategy of public education, litigation, and legislative reform.38 In a series of 
class action law suits, advocates sued police departments that had demonstrated a 
pattern of refusing to arrest batterers.39 Mandatory arrest laws were championed that 
required the police to arrest batterers ifthere was probable cause to believe that a crime 
between intimates existed.40 Activists also promoted laws authorizing police officers to 
make warrantless arrests in cases involving domestic violence, eliminating a protection 
for defendants that had posed a significant obstacle to women seeking police 
assistance.41 Additionally, advocates pushed District Attorney offices to adopt "no-
drop policies," which limited prosecutorial discretion by preventing prosecutors from 
dropping cases based on claims that the complaining witness was reluctant to 
cooperate.42 
The mandatory arrest laws and no-drop policies were not without their critics. Some 
advocates questioned whether these developments would deter women from seeking 
assistance, while others suggested that such policies revictirnized and disempowered 
36. Sally F. Goldfarb, Violence Against WomenandthePersistenceofPrivacy, 61 OmoST. 
L.J. l, 47 (2000) (citing to congressional testimony by the National Organization of Women 
Legal Defense and Education Fund in support of the Violence Against Women Act, Women and 
Violence: Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., lOlst Cong., pt. l, 64-67 (1990)). 
3 7. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 31, at 44 ("One of the first and most important legal issues 
that came to the fore was the failure of police to protect battered women from assault."); Epstein, 
supra note 35, at l3 ("Since the early 1970s, battered women's advocates have called upon 
police and prosecutors to treat domestic violence 'like any other crime.' This plea was voiced in 
response to a long-standing failure by these officials to recognize a criminal dimension to family 
abuse."); David Jaros, The Lessons ofPeople v. Moscat: Confronting Judicial Bias in Domestic 
Violence Cases Interpreting Crawford v. Washington, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 995, l 000 (2005). 
38. SCHNEIDER, supra note 31, at 44. 
39. Id See, e.g., Bruno v. Codd, 393 N.E.2d 976 (N.Y. 1979) (describing an action for 
"declaratory and injunctive relief against officials and employees of New York City Police 
Department, Department of Probation and Family Court alleging a pattern and practice of 
discrimination and misconduct against [battered wives] by reason of defendants' failure to 
enforce and comply with controlling statutes and regulations with reference to complaints by 
battered wives"); Complaint, Scott v. Hart, No. C-76-2395 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 1976) (complaint 
initiating class action suit challenging the procedures of the Oakland Police Department and 
seeking effective police protection of domestic violence victims). 
40. Miccio, supra note 34, at 265 (describing the battered women's movement's 
development of mandatory arrest strategies); see also SCHNEIDER, supra note 31, at 184. 
41. Epstein, supra note 16, at 1853. Prior to the reforms, many states did not allow police 
officers to arrest defendants accused of committing misdemeanor crimes if the misdemeanor was 
not committed in the officer's presence. !d. As most domestic violence crimes were 
misdemeanors, this policy was a significant obstacle to arresting alleged batterers. !d. 
42. ScHNEIDER, supra note 31, at 184-85 (describing the promotion of no-drop policies by 
victim advocates). 
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women by depriving them of autonomy and subjecting them to state coercion.43 
Ultimately, the majority of advocates agreed that the policies, while perhaps flawed, 
were "essential to correct the systemic abandonment of women survivors of male 
intimate violence.'.« 
C. The Omission of Procedural Protections for Accused Batterers Facing 
Protective Orders: The New York Experience 
Many of the domestic violence reforms promoted by activists and policymakers 
significantly reduced procedural protections for alleged batterers.45 For example, 
statutes authorizing the police to make warrantless arrests in domestic violence cases 
eliminated a procedural protection for defendants that was widely regarded as an 
impediment to successful state intervention in domestic violence cases.46 
Similarly, awareness of the courts' historic refusal to intervene on behalfofbattered 
women led to the conscious elimination or avoidance of procedural protections that 
could provide reluctant judges with an excuse not to issue protective orders. A close 
examination of the evolution of New York's order of protection law reveals a 
conscious effort to avoid procedural protections that might be used to justify a judge's 
refusal to issue a protective order. 
In 1962, the New York state legislature passed the unified Family Court Act 
(FCA). 47 The FCA created a single tribunal "capable of adjudicating every justiciable 
family related dispute.'.-48 The state legislature afforded the newly established family 
court "a wide range of powers for dealing with the complexities offamily life so that 
its action [might] fit the particular needs ofthose before it.'.-49 Among those powers was 
the ability to issue orders of protection wholly apart from other judicial orders of 
support or custody. 5° 
43. !d. at 186. 
44. Miccio, supra note 34, at 245. 
45. Epstein, supra note 16, at 1845 (noting that domestic violence reforms have "reduced 
the level of procedural justice accorded to barterers"). 
46. !d. at 1853. 
47. Family Court Act, ch. 686, 1962 N.Y. Laws 3043 (codified as amended at N.Y. FAM. 
CT. AcT§§ 111-1019 (McKinney2008, 2009, & 2010)). The FCA, and the specific orders of 
protection it authorized, did not represent a concerted effort to liberate women from destructive 
relationships. To the contrary, the Act was explicitly intended to provide "practical help" so that 
families could remain intact. As part of that effort, the FCA effectively decriminalized domestic 
violence by stripping the New York criminal courts of jurisdiction over acts, which would 
constitute either assault or disorderly conduct between spouses under the rationale that domestic 
violence was a private matter ill-suited for the criminal courts. See Judith A. Smith, Battered 
Non- Wives and Unequal Protection-Order Coverage: A Call for Reform, 23 YALE L. & PoL'Y 
REv. 93, 127 (2005) (describing the New York legislature's intention to decriminalize domestic 
violence and to put related issues in a court that was supposedly well-suited and uniquely 
qualified to solve what was then considered a private family matter). 
48. Merril Sobie, The Family Court: A Short History, (Mar. 2003), 
http://www.courts.state.ny.uslhistory/family _ ct/History _Fam _ Ct.htrn. 
49. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT§ 141. 
50. Family Court Act, ch. 686, §§ 841-42,1962 N.Y. Laws(codifiedasamendedatN.Y. 
FAM. CT. ACT§§ 841-42 (McKinney 2010)). 
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Under the original version of the FCA, orders of protection could be obtained only 
if the allegations of assault or disorderly conduct in the family offense petition were 
first proven by a preponderance of the evidence in an "adjudicatory hearing."51 In 
1964, two years after its passage, the FCA was amended so that a family court judge 
could, "for good cause shown," issue a preliminary order of protection prior to the 
adjudicatory hearing.52 While the amendment empowered family court judges to 
dispense with the full evidentiary hearing, fundamental procedural safeguards for 
alleged batterers remained in place, as the provisions authorizing temporary protective 
orders were interpreted to require a "full judicial inquiry" before a finding of good 
cause could be made. 53 
From 1962 to 1977, a battered spouse in New York was unable to press charges in 
criminal court for misdemeanor crimes associated with domestic abuse. 54 In response 
to increasingly vocal criticism from women's groups regarding the State's failure to 
combat domestic violence/5 the New York legislature gave the criminal court 
concurrent jurisdiction over family offenses, thereby enabling women to choose a 
forum in which criminal penalties would be available to the court. 56 Concerned that 
women would be forced to choose between pressing charges in criminal court and 
obtaining an order of protection in family court, the New York legislature, for the first 
time, gave criminal courts the statutory power to issue orders of protection. The 
criminal courts' authority, however, was limited to issuing protective orders only in 
cases alleging a narrow set of"family offense" crimes between household members. 57 
51. Family Court Act, ch. 686, § 82l(a), § 832 1962 N.Y. Laws 3043, 3124, 3126 
(requiring the petition to include allegations of assault or disorderly conduct). 
52. Act to Amend the Family Court Act, ch. 156, § 7 1964 N.Y. Laws 770,771 (codified as 
amended at N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT§ 828 (McKinney 2010)). 
53. Ahmed v. Ahmed, 689 N.Y.S.2d 357, 360 (Nassau County Sup. Ct. 1999) (citing 
Douglas J. Besharov, Practice Commentaries, N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT§ 828 (McKinney 1964)); see 
also Owre v. Owre, 400 N.Y.S.2d 131, 132 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977); People v. Koertge, 701 
N.Y.S.2d 588, 594 (Nassau County Dist. Ct. 1998). 
54. By 1969, family court had exclusive jurisdiction over disorderly conduct, harassment, 
menacing, reckless endangerment, assault, or attempted assault between spouses or between 
parent and child or between members of the same family or household. See Act of May 22, 
1969, ch. 736, § 2, 1969 N.Y. Laws, 1942, 1942 (codified as amended at N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT§ 
812 (McKinney 2010)). 
55. Evidence of the important role that feminist advocacy groups played in securing the 
passage of the 1977 amendments can be seen in the bill jacket attached to the 1977legislation, 
in which the report from the State Division of the Budget explicitly acknowledges that the bill 
was "supported by most women's groups" including the New York City and Albany Chapters of 
the National Organization for Women. The report further states that "[t]here is a consensus 
among women's groups that Family Court remedies are not working and that there is a genuine 
need to at least temporarily incarcerate some husbands." NEW YoRK STATE DIVISION OF THE 
BUDGET, BUDGET REPORT ON GENERAL ASSEMBLY BILL A.8842 3 (1977). 
56. Act of July 19, 1977, ch. 449, § I, 1977 N.Y. Sess. Laws I, I (codified as amended at 
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT§ 812(1) (McKinney 2010)). See Koertge, 701 N.Y.S.2d at 591 ("The 
temporary order of protection was necessary in all three courts so that the abused victim would 
not have to forego the protection by choice of forum."). 
57. Specifically, the criminal court was authorized to issue protective orders only when the 
defendant faced one or more of the following charges: disorderly conduct, harassment, 
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The decision to authorize criminal courts to issue orders of protection did not 
receive universal support. In its comments on the proposed legislation, the New York 
Division of Criminal Justice Services (CJS) opposed the legislature's decision ''to 
engraft upon the criminal courts a process peculiar to Family Court procedures."58 
Arguing that many judges "lack the necessary legal training and sociological insights" 
to administer the provisions appropriately, CJS asserted that orders of protection 
"present a potential for great difficulties."59 
Yet even the law's critics failed to identify a crucial difference between§ 828 of the 
Family Court Act and the language in Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) § 530.11, the 
newly enacted section of the criminal procedure law authorizing criminal courts to 
issue protective orders. Wholly unacknowledged in the legislative materials attached to 
the bill was the fact that the legislature had not "en grafted" the exact language of§ 828 
into the CPL. The legislature had, in fact, omitted the language "for good cause shown" 
in the CPL, thereby eliminating the requirement that criminal courts make a "full 
judicial inquiry" before issuing orders capable of depriving defendants of access to 
their home or their children.60 
The decision to eliminate the good cause requirement is best explained by 
legislators' fear that judges would, if given the opportunity, refrain from issuing orders 
of protection in domestic violence cases. Legislators were very much aware of the 
criminal justice system's reluctance to intervene on behalf of battered women. The 
Division of the Budget noted in its recommendation in favor of the bill that "[i]t could 
be argued that there is no current evidence to suggest that criminal courts [will] use the 
full extent of their powers to punish these offenses ... .'.61 
Moreover, the decision to drop the good cause language clearly was deliberate. 
Four years after granting criminal courts the power to issue orders of protection in 
cases involving family offenses, the legislature authorized criminal courts to issue 
protective orders on behalf of any victim in any criminal case. Surprisingly, the 
legislature did not simply expand § 530.11 to include a broader array of crimes and 
victims. Instead, a separate provision, CPL § 530.13, which authorized the issuance of 
protective orders for nonfamily members, was introduced.62 This new provision, unlike 
the one authorizing protective orders for family members, included the original 
language from the Family Court Act requiring that judges make a finding that there is 
good cause to issue the order.63 As a result of the discrepancy between the two statutes, 
menacing, reckless endangerment, assault, attempted assault, or attempted murder.§ 11977 N.Y. 
Sess. Laws at 1. Thus, if a husband burglarized his estranged wife's house, killed her pet, or 
damaged her property, the criminal court would not be authorized to issue a protective order. 
58. Memorandum from Robert Schlanger, General Counsel, New York State Division of 
Criminal Justice Services, to Judah Gribetz, Counsel, Governor Hugh L. Carey (July 6, 1977). 
59. /d. 
60. Act of July 19, 1977, ch. 449, § 11, 1977 N.Y. Laws 1, 3 (recodified as amended at 
N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW§ 530.12 (McKinney Supp. 2010)) (conferring to criminal courts 
concurrent jurisdiction over family offenses, authorizing criminal courts to issue protective 
orders to victims of family offenses, and authorizing criminal courts to issue orders of 
protection). 
61. NEW YORK STATE DMSION OF THE BUDGET, BUDGET REPORT ON GENERAL AsSEMBLY 
BILL A.8842 4 (1977). 
62. Act of July 15, 1981, ch. 575, § 1, 1981 N.Y. Laws 1849-50 (codified as amended at 
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW§ 530.13 (McKinney Supp. 2010)). 
63. See id. Compare N.Y. CRIM. PRoc.LAw § 530.12(l)(McKinneySupp. 2010) ("When a 
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criminal courts in New York are afforded greater discretion to issue orders of 
protection that interfere with the ostensibly protected relationship between parent and 
child than they are between complete strangers. 
Any questions concerning the legislature's intentions regarding procedural 
protections for alleged batterers were laid to rest when the statute was amended in 
1988 as part of a legislative effort to encourage criminal court judges to issue more 
protective orders. As originally drafted,§ 530.12 stated that a criminal court could add 
additional provisions to a protective order to preclude the defendant from frequenting 
places where the named family member might be found (such as the complainant's 
home or place of employment).64 In the years following the statute's enactment, 
domestic violence advocacy groups and some members of the state legislature grew 
frustrated with the continued reluctance of judges to issue orders that barred defendants 
from the homes they shared with the complainants. The 1988 amendment was a 
deliberate effort to "encourage the use of orders of exclusion"65 by requiring judges to 
issue written decisions explaining why they had either issued or refused to issue an 
order that included a ban on visiting the complainant's home or place of employment. 66 
In fact, the amendment was drafted terribly, and a plain reading of the language, 
despite its universally agreed upon purpose,67 suggests that judges need to issue a 
written decision only in cases in which the order includes a prohibition on visiting the 
complainant's home or place of employrnent.68 The poorly drafted amendment did 
criminal action is pending involving a complaint charging any crime or violation between 
spouses, former spouses, [or] parent and child, ... the court, in addition to any other powers 
conferred upon it by this chapter may issue a temporary order of protection .... " (emphasis 
added)), with N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW§ 530.13(1) (McKinneySupp. 2010)("Whenanycriminal 
action is pending, and the court has not issued a temporary order of protection pursuant to 
section 530.12 ofthis article, the court, in addition to the other powers conferred upon it by this 
chapter, may for good cause shown issue a temporary order of protection .... "(emphasis 
added)). 
64. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW§ 530.12(a) (McKinney Supp. 2010). 
65. People v. Forman, 546 N.Y.S.2d 755, 767 n.3 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1989) ("[T]he purpose of 
the amendment was to encourage the use of orders of exclusion, but the language of the section 
'lends itself to an interpretation that is just the opposite of the one intended."' (citing Peter 
Preiser, Supplemental Commentaries, N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW§ 530.12 (McKinney 1984 & 
Supp. 1989))). 
66. In her comments on the floor of the New York Assembly on August 24, 1988, 
Representative Helene Weinstein repeatedly stressed that the purpose of the amendment was to 
encourage the issuance of protective orders that include provisions banning defendants from the 
complaining witness' home and place of work. Representative Weinstein's comments were 
included in the legislative materials attached to the bill when it was forwarded to Governor 
Mario Cuomo to sign. When Governor Cuomo signed the bill, he issued a Memorandum of 
Approval explaining that the factors listed in the statute were to be considered "illustrative" and 
"not intended to limit the circumstances in which a court may order an individual to stay away 
from the home." Governor Mario M. Cuomo, Memorandum of Approval, Act of Sept. 2, 1988, 
ch. 702, § 530.12, 1988 N.Y. Laws 3172-73. 
67. Cuomo, supra note 66; Forman, 546 N.Y.S.2d at 767 n.3. 
68. See Forman, 546 N.Y.S.2d at 767 n.3 ("[T]he purpose of the amendment was to 
encourage the use of orders of exclusion, but the language of the section lends itself to an 
interpretation that is just the opposite of the one intended." (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(citing Peter Preiser, Supplemental Commentaries, N.Y. CRIM. PROC. Law§ 530.12 (McKinney 
1984 & Supp. 1989))). 
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make clear, however, that the legislature had no intention of establishing procedural 
protections for defendant family members. Appended to the language requiring judges 
to examine the need for the order was additional language explicitly explaining that an 
order of protection was valid even if the judge had not considered whether such an 
order was appropriate.69 
By 1988, orders of protection had become a ubiquitous feature of the criminal 
justice system in New York. Issued in cases involving all types of crimes and all kinds 
of defendants, protective orders were no longer limited to domestic violence or tied to 
the concern of balancing "power differentials between men and women."70 In cases 
involving family members, however, procedural protections for defendants had been 
substantially diminished in an effort to overcome the system's resistance to intervening 
in domestic violence cases. As policing strategies focused increasingly on relationships 
between other family members, namely parents and children, orders of protection 
began to be used against the very women they were originally designed to liberate, 
empower, and protect. 
D. The Order of Protection in Criminal Neglect Cases 
A parent arrested in New York City on a charge of endangering the welfare of a 
child71 can expect to spend approximately twenty-four hours in jail before she sees a 
lawyer and is arraigned by a judge. 72 At the arraignment, the parent is given notice of 
the charge against her and the judge must decide whether to set bail or release her on 
her own recognizance.73 It is at the arraignment that the judge makes the initial 
decision whether or not to issue the order of protection, which can require, among 
other things, that the defendant parent stay away from her child. 
There is a strong likelihood that prosecutors will request orders of protection in 
. cases alleging endangering the welfare of the child, even when the factual allegations 
suggest no immediate risk of subsequent harm to the child. New York county 
prosecutors are instructed to follow a "mandatory domestic violence protocol" in every 
case involving a '"crime or violation committed by a defendant against ... a member 
of his or her same family or household .... "74 This protocol includes, among other 
69. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §530.12(a) (McKinney Supp. 2010). 
70. Sally Engle Merry, Rights, Religion, and Community: Approaches to Violence Against 
Women in the Context of Globalization, 35 LAW & Soc'YR.EV. 39,49 (2001). 
71. See N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 260.10 (McKinney 2008); Vreeland, supra note 4, at 1053. 
72. See UDI 0FER, YANILDA GoNZALEZ & ROBERT PERRY, JUSTICE DELAYED, JUSTICE 
DENIED: A STUDY OF ARREST-To-ARRAIGNMENT TIMES IN NEW YORK CITY 3 (2006); see also 
People ex rei. Maxian v. Brown, 570 N.E.2d 223, 225 (N.Y. 1991 )(describing New York City 
arraignment process). 
73. N.Y. CRIM.PROC.LAW §§ 510.20, 510.30(McKinney2009);Forman,546N.Y.S.2dat 
762. 
74. Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 YALE L.J. 2, 42-43 (2006) (quoting 2004 
CRIMINAL CoURT CRIMEs MANuAL 18 (2004)) (first alteration in original). Because policies and 
norms vary from one prosecutor's office to another, one must be cautious in drawing broad 
conclusions about institutional practices from the policies of a specific office. However, at least 
one study found an "amazing consistency that prevails in prosecutorial decision making systems 
throughout the United States." A. Didrick Castberg, Prosecutorial Independence in Japan, 16 
UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 38, 44 n.35 (1997) (quoting JOAN E. JACOBY ET. AL., U.S. DEP'T OF 
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things, instructions that the prosecutor request the court to issue an order of protection 
at arraignment barring the defendant from all contact with the complaining witness.75 
Because of the protocol's expansive definition of "domestic violence," the District 
Attorney's policy for requesting orders of protection applies to neglectful parents 
accused of endangering the welfare of a child as well as violent abusers.76 
There are significant pressures on judges to accede to prosecutors' requests for 
protective orders.77 Judges cannot be too careful when it comes to restraining alleged 
criminals.78 As one criminal court judge explained, "'Like they tell you in judge 
school, no one ever wound up on the front page ofThe New York Post for setting high 
bail. "'79 Judges who fail to restrain criminal defendants, by refusing either to set high 
bail or to issue orders of protection, risk being attacked by the media (and the 
prosecution) should the defendant subsequently harm the alleged victim.80 As one 
scholar (and former Manhattan District Attorney) explained: 
Judges in New York City issue [Temporary Orders of Protection] in virtually 
(almost without exception) every case in which the Prosecutor requests one. Right 
or wrong, that's the way it is. Not issuing an Order ofProtection is perceived as an 
extremely dangerous thing to do. The New York Post would have a field day if 
JUSTICE, PROSECUTORIAL DECISION MAKING: A NATIONAL STUDY 27 (1982)). Moreover, while 
many District Attorney's offices may not have adopted explicit policies requiring line 
prosecutors to request orders of protection, many of the same political concerns that prompt 
judges to issue protective orders, see infra text accompanying notes 78-83, also induce 
prosecutors to request them. 
75. Suk, supra note 74, at 48 (citing 2004 CRIMINAL COURT CRIMES MANUAL 18). 
76. See supra note 4. 
77. David H. Taylor, Maria V. Stoilkov & Daniel J. Greco, Ex Parte Domestic Violence 
Orders of Protection: How Easing Access to Judicial Process Has Eased the Possibility for 
Abuse of the Process, 18 KAN. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 83, 92 (2008) (''No judge wants to deny an 
order of protection to a person who is later injured or killed by the person against whom they 
unsuccessfully sought relief."). 
78. Judy Harris Kluger, Independence Under Siege: Unbridled Criticism of Judges and 
Prosecutors, 5 J.L. & POL'Y 535, 536-37 (1997) ("If a defendant commits a new crime while 
released on bail, the judge who set the original bail is often criticized, and the critics ignore any 
discussion ofNew York State law which prohibits preventative detention."). 
79. David Feige, Bumble in the Bronx, LEGAL AFF., July/Aug. 2002, 
http://www .legalaffairs.org/issues/July-August-2002/feature _ feige _julaug2002.rnsp. 
80. The story of former Brooklyn Judge Lorin Duckman is a striking example of the costs a 
judge can face by failing to sufficiently restrain a defendant. Judge Duckman released a 
defendant on bail over the prosecution's objections, noting that the defendant had already been 
incarcerated for the full term of the maximum sentence he would serve if convicted. Tragically, 
three weeks after his release, the defendant killed his live-in girlfriend. The murder triggered a 
media frenzy in New York that culminated in an ultimatum from then-Governor George Pataki 
to the New York Commission on Judicial Conduct, demanding that the Commission remove 
Judge Duckman from office. The commission capitulated and removed the judge from the 
bench. Duckman's removal was later upheld by the New York Court of Appeals despite a 
particularly vigorous dissent. Abraham Abramovsky & Jonathan I. Edelstein, Prosecuting 
Judges for Ethical Violations: Are Criminal Sanctions Constitutional and Prudent, or Do They 
Constitute a Threat to Judicial Independence?, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 727, 763--64 (2006); In 
re Duckman, 699 N.E.2d 872, 881 (N.Y. 1998). 
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something happened in a case in which a judge refused to issue a requested 
[Temporary Order ofProtection].81 
1459 
While there are certainly thoughtful judges who will refrain from issuing unjustified 
orders of protection that separate parents from their children, the risk offailing to issue 
such an order is undeniable. 
Moreover, the decision to issue an order of protection is initially made in the 
context of the judge's decision whether or not to release the defendant on her own 
recognizance.82 Given the political risks of releasing defendants, judges may view 
orders of protection as a costless way to insulate themselves against the seemingly 
lenient decision to release defendants from custody. As a result, judges may view 
releasing a parent with an order of protection barring her from contact with her child as 
the lesser of two possible state intrusions on the defendant's liberties. 
E. Criminal Court Orders Subject to Family Court Modification 
Many New York Criminal Court judges issue orders of protection barring parents 
from seeing their children but make the order "subject to family court" order of 
modification.83 In essence, the criminal court temporarily abrogates a parent's right to 
associate with her child, but allows another court to alter the order if it sees fit. At first 
blush, this practice suggests some procedural protection for parents inasmuch as it 
creates an alternative avenue to regain custody oftheir children. Closer examination, 
however, suggests that this option works to parents' detriment. 
First, such provisions likely increase the probability that criminal court judges will 
issue the orders in the first place. While judges might once have closely weighed the 
impact of their decisions on the parent-child relationship, judges can avoid taking 
responsibility for separating a child from its parent by passing the buck to the family 
courts for resolution. Second, by issuing a protective order and making it subject to 
modification, criminal courts effectively flip the burden of proof. Had the case started 
in family court, the government would have been required to prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence that removal of the child was warranted to avoid imminent risk to the 
child's life or health.84 By passing through criminal court first, the burden shifts to the 
parent to persuade a family court judge to take the political risk of affirmatively 
altering the criminal court's separation order.85 Finally, there is no guarantee that the 
81. See Suk, supra note 74, at 49 n.202 (quoting Shalley & Murray, New York Domestic 
Violence Cases, http://www.queensdefense.com/domestic _violence_ cases.htm). 
82. "Release on recognizance" means setting bail at zero. 
83. Vreeland, supra note 4, at 1083. 
84. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT§§ 1027, 1046(b) (McK.inney2010); Nassau County Dep't of Soc. 
Servs. ex rei. Miranda H. v. Laquetta H., 595 N.Y.S.2d 97, 98 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993). 
85. As discussed above, judges put their own careers in political jeopardy when they choose 
to allow children to return to their parents. See Jane M. Spinak, Adding Value to Families: The 
Potential of Model Family Courts, 2002 WIS. L. REv. 331, 348-49 (2002) ('"[T]he specter of a 
headline announcing that a child has suffered injury or death as a result of being returned to its 
parents looms more realistically for most judges and may cause some to [separate children from 
their parents]."' (quoting Peggy Cooper Davis & Gautam Barua, Custodial Choices for Children 
at Risk: Bias, Sequentiality, and the Law, 2 U. Cm. L. SCH. RoUNDTABLE 139, !52 (1995))). For 
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protective order will ever come before a family court judge to be modified. 86 Judges 
include the modification language in orders of protection because it is not unusual for 
social services to start a parallel proceeding in family court shortly after the criminal 
case commences. 87 There are times, however, when ACS will, upon further 
investigation, determine that there is no need for intervention, and the agency will 
refrain from filing a parallel case in family court. As a result, those cases least likely to 
justify separating a parent from her child are also least likely ever to be reviewed (and 
then modified) by a family court judge. Ultimately, provisions allowing for family 
court modification of criminal court orders of protection likely exacerbate, rather than 
ameliorate, the criminal courts' failure to consider parents' rights. 
Nor do provisions allowing for subsequent family court modification erase the 
constitutional defects inherent in the practice of issuing orders of protection that 
separate parents from their children. 88 In Stanley v. Illinois, the Court flatly rejected the 
suggestion that procedures that might subsequently restore custody could remedy the 
failure of a court to provide adequate process at the initial separation; as Justice White 
explained, "This Court has not ... embraced the general proposition that a wrong may 
be done if it can be undone."89 Stanley further recognized the cognizable harm that 
results from the "delay between the doing and the undoing" of orders stripping parents 
of custody. 90 Provisions allowing for family court modifications merely reduce the 
likelihood that judges will carefully consider the consequences of separation orders. 
They do little to ameliorate the constitutional flaws in the process. 
II. THE INCREASING CRIMINALIZA TION OF NEGLECT AND ITS DISPROPORTIONATE 
IMPACT ON POOR MINORITY WOMEN 
The last two decades have seen a dramatic increase in the criminal prosecution of 
parents for factual allegations that would once have prompted neglect proceedings in 
family court.91 There are a number of explanations for the growing criminalization of 
a discussion ofhow cognitive biases might further discourage judges from returning children to 
their parents, see Davis & Barna, supra, at 149 (describing how "[ t ]he responsibility hypothesis 
suggests that if the child has experienced a pre-trial removal, the judge is likely to shun 
responsibility for the risk associated with the action of returning the child"). 
86. Vreeland, supra note 4, at 1083-84 (stating that often, judges in criminal court will 
issue orders of protection with "a clause that makes them 'subject to family court,' which relies 
on the family court judge to ameliorate the situation. Here, the concern is not that the arrest 
initiates a family court case, but rather that, without a concurrent family court case, a full 
protection order remains in place, barring the parent from seeing the child. [One criminal court 
judge] found this concern to be so compelling that, as a result, he often issues limited, rather 
than full, orders."). 
87. In such cases, the criminal court case often tracks the family court case; the disposition 
ofthe criminal charges is largely an afterthought of the family court case. (Some practitioners 
complain that each court wants to wait for the other to resolve its case, and, as a result, both 
cases tend to progress at a snail's pace.) 
88. See infra Part III. 
89. 405 u.s. 645, 647 (1972). 
90. Jd. 
91. See People v. Smith, 678 N.Y.S.2d 872,875 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1998) (noting that "there 
are an increasing number of these so called 'home alone cases'[) appearing in Criminal Court 
which are charged under section one ofP.L. § 260.1 0"); Shannon DeRouselle, Welfare Reform 
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neglect. Some have suggested that the increased prosecution of parents was a natural 
expansion of the "mandatory arrest policy" used in cases of domestic violence.92 
Scholars have noted how the domestic violence movement successfully recast the home 
as a place where the criminal law appropriately intervenes and coercively reorders 
private relationships.93 This recasting of the home as a public space likely has 
contributed to the increased willingness of state actors to involve themselves in 
policing parents as well as husbands and wives. 94 The extension of criminal liability to 
include neglect likewise is consistent with criminal law's general propensity to expand 
into new substantive areas oflaw. 95 Scholars have described how the politics of getting 
''tough on crime" combine with institutional forces favoring increased discretion for 
law enforcement to lead to ever-increasing crirninalliability.96 
The application over the last two decades of the "broken windows" approach to 
crime prevention likely has contributed to the use of the criminal justice system to 
police neglect. The "broken windows" theory presumes that the intensive policing of 
minor infractions can help deter more serious crimes.97 In the late nineties, New York 
City, for example, "extended the broken windows philosophy to its child protection 
policy, implementing a campaign of arresting [parents] for misdemeanor child 
endangerment on the theory that it [would] deter more serious child abuse. "98 
Finally, several highly publicized failures of the civil child welfare system have 
likely contributed to the rising use of the criminal justice system to police neglectful 
and the Administration for Children's Services: Subjecting Children and Families to Poverty 
and Then Punishing Them for It, 25N.Y.U. REv. L. &Soc. CHANGE403, 421 (1999) (pointing 
out that ''New York City's use of its police force to handle minor neglect as well as more serious 
cases of abuse ha[ d) contributed to a 60% increase in misdemeanor arrests for endangering 
children" over a two-year period); Meghan Scahill, Prosecuting Attorneys in Dependency 
Proceedings in Juvenile Court: Defining and Assessing a Critical Role in Child Abuse and 
Neglect Cases, 1 J. CENTER FOR CHILD. & CTS. 73, 78 (1999)(noting that ''the criminalization of 
child abuse and neglect has increased significantly''); Vreeland, supra note 4, at 1061 
(examining the increasing numbers of parents prosecuted in criminal court for acts of child 
neglect that were traditionally handled through child protective services and the family court); 
Eric C. Shedlosky, Comment, Protecting Children from the Harmful Behavior of Adults, 98 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY299, 312-13 (2007) (noting how policy changes have resulted in an 
increase in the number of parents who have been arrested and criminally prosecuted for acts that 
previously would have been addressed by the civil child welfare system). 
92. Vreeland, supra note 4, at 1053. 
93. SUK, supra note 14, at 16-17; see Linda C. McClain, The Domain of Civic Virtue in a 
Good Society: Families, Schools, and Sex Equality, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 1617, 1649 (2001) 
("[G]overnrnent properly prohibits family violence and, in public awareness campaigns about 
domestic violence, sends a message that contradicts any assumption that such violence is a 
'private' matter or that family life affords a space immune from protection against violence."). 
94. SUK, supra note 14, at 16-17. 
95. See ld. at 11; Stuntz, supra note 15,at 507; Suk,supranote 74, at 5; Paul Rosenzweig, 
The Over-Criminalization of Social and Economic Conduct, CHAMPION, Aug. 2003, at 28, 35 
("This wide span of American law is the product of institutional pressures that draw legislators 
to laws with broader liability rules and harsher sentences."). 
96. See Stuntz, supra note 15, at 509-10. 
97. See generally James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and 
Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC MoNTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29. 
98. Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of Order-
Maintenance Policing, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775, 833-34 (1999). 
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parents. The 1995 grisly murder of Elisa Izquierdo by her mother highlighted 
numerous problems with New York's child welfare system.99 The media frenzy which 
followed led to a number of social service reforms including an effort by the then-
newly appointed Administration for Children's Services Commissioner to incorporate 
criminal prosecutions into the city's strategy for fighting child abuse.100 Two years 
later, New York Police Commissioner Howard Safir directed all New York City police 
officers to "take action ... when [they] see children in dangerous situations."101 
Ultimately, the causes of increased criminalization of child welfare are less 
important than its effect. As the state's strategy for protecting children increasingly 
relies on the use of the criminal justice system, it becomes progressively more 
important that criminal courts protect parents' fundamental liberty interest in 
maintaining a relationship with their children. 
Moreover, the criminalization of neglect and the courts' attendant failure to 
adequately protect defendant parents' rights have a disproportionate impact on discrete 
segments of society, namely poor women of color. 102 Low-income women of color are 
far more likely to be prosecuted for neglectful acts than any other group.103 "[W]omen 
are almost six times more likely than men to be custodial parents."104 As a result, there 
are simply many more opportunities for women to neglect their children than for 
men.
105 Additionally, because of societal expectations that women are better suited 
99. See Martin Guggenheim, Somebody 's Children: Sustaining the Family's Place in Child 
Welfare Policy, 113 HARv. L. REv. 1716, 1725 n.41, 1725-26 (2000) (reviewing ELIZABETH 
BARTHOLET, NOBODY'S CHILDREN: ABUSE AND NEGLECT, FOSTER DRIFf, AND THE ADoPTION 
ALTERNATIVE (1999)) (describing how the number of child welfare cases in New York City 
soared in the aftermath of the Izquierdo case). 
100. Martin G. Karopkin, Child Abuse and Neglect: New Role for Criminal Court, N.Y. L.J., 
Feb. 28, 1996, at 1, 4 ("The highly publicized death of Elisa Izquierdo has led to more 
fundamental changes in the way child abuse cases are handled by both police and prosecutors. 
These changes have brought a steady stream of criminal cases where the injuries are less severe 
or where there is no injury and the charges involve allegations of neglect."); Kim Nauer, Zero 
Tolerance, CITY LIMITS MAGAZINE, Aug./Sept. 1997. 
101. DOROTHY E. ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE 78 (2002) 
(quoting Joanne Wasserman, More Kids Left Alone, State Says, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, July 27, 
1997, at 4) (alteration in original). 
102. Annette R. Appell, Protecting Children or Punishing Mothers: Gender, Race, and 
Class in the Child Protection System [An Essay], 48 S.C. L. REv. 577, 578 (1997) 
("Nationwide, juvenile courts and child protection agencies target hundreds of thousands of 
mothers who are disproportionately poor and of color, even though child abuse and neglect is 
not confined to any social class or race."). 
103. See ROBERTS, supra note 101 (identifying the extreme racial and class disparity that 
marks the child welfare system); Naomi Cahn, Policing Women: Moral Arguments and the 
Dilemmas of Criminalization, 49 DEPAUL L. REv. 817, 818 (2000) (describing the 
criminalization of neglect and its disproportionate impact on women); Donna Coker, Foreword: 
Addressing the Real World of Racial Injustice in the Criminal Justice System, 93 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 827, 829 (2003) (describing the "overwhelming empirical evidence 
demonstrating unjust and unequal treatment in the criminal justice system of African Americans 
and ... Latinos"). 
104. Cahn, supra note 103, at 819. 
105. Jennifer M. Collins, Crime and Parenthood: The Uneasy Case for Prosecuting 
Negligent Parents, 100 Nw. U. L. REv. 807, 817 (2006)( explaining that mothers are most likely 
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than men to care for children, they often are treated more harshly when they are 
accused offailing to provide adequate care for their children. 106 Furthermore, women, 
and particularly women of color, are more likely than men to be poor. 107 Not 
surprisingly, there is a high correlation between poverty and neglect. 108 Indeed, the 
symptoms of indigence-poor nutrition and housekeeping, inadequate medical care, 
leaving children unattended, and substandard housing-are often the bases for neglect 
charges despite being rooted in poverty rather than parental unfitness. 109 Additionally, 
because poor people generally are under greater government supervision by virtue of 
their need to interact with institutions like public hospitals, welfare agencies, public 
housing offices, and probation officers, neglectful acts of the poor are less likely to 
escape the notice of the authorities than those of the wealthy.110 
Finally, the role of race cannot be ignored. Both the child welfare system and the 
criminal courts have long been marked by racial disparities. 111 Families of color are 
grossly overrepresented in the child welfare system, 112 and blacks and Latinos 
to be the perpetrators of neglect due to the'" disproportionate numbers of children in the custody 
of their mothers rather than their fathers"' (quoting CHERYL L. MEYER & MICHELLE OBERMAN, 
MOTIIERS WHO KiLL THEIR CHILDREN: UNDERSTANDING TilE ACTS OF MOMS FROM SUSAN SMITH 
TO TilE "PROM MOM" 97-98 (2001))). 
106. See Appell, supra note 102, at 584-85 ("When fathers are involved in the proceedings, 
they are usually subject to lower expectations md are significmtly less likely to be criminally 
charged with neglect or passive abuse of their children."); Cahn, supra note 103, at 818 
("Because women are so closely identified with their children, they are treated particularly 
harshly for alleged crimes against their children."). 
107. Women were about 40% more likely to be poor thm men in 2006; the poverty rate was 
12.4% for women arJd 8.8% for men. LEGAL MOMENTUM, READING BETWEEN TilE LINES: 
WOMEN'S POVERTY IN TilE UNITED STATES, 2006 1 (Sept. 2007), 
https:/ /secure2.convio.net/legalrnlsite/DocServer!lm _povertyreport2006. pdf?dociD=721; Aric 
K. Short, Slaves for Rent: Sexual Harassment in Housing as Involuntary Servitude, 86 NEB. L. 
REv. 838, 855 n.l 00 (2008) ("[W]omen are 39% more likely to be poor tharJ men."). 
108. ROBERTS, supra note 101, at 29 (citing a U.S. Department of Health md HumarJ 
Services report that instarJces of child abuse md neglect were twenty-six times higher in low-
income families). 
109. See Smith v Org. ofFoster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816,834 (1977) 
(noting studies that indicate that social workers' attitudes reflect "a bias that treats the natural 
parents' poverty md lifestyle as prejudicial to the best interests of the child"); ROBERTS, supra 
note 101, at 27 ("Poverty is confused with neglect ... because 'it often comes packaged with 
depression md mger, poor nutrition md housekeeping, lack of education md medical care, 
leaving children alone, exposing children to improper influences."' (quoting LINDA GoRDON, 
THE GREAT ARizONA ORPHAN ABDUCTION 309 (1999))). 
110. ROBERTS, supra note 101, at 29 ("Government authorities are more likely to detect child 
maltreatment in poor families, who are more closely supervised by social md law enforcement 
agencies."); Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, 
Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1419, 1432 (1991). 
Ill. ROBERTS, supra note I 01; Coker, supra note I 03, at 829 (describing the "overwhelming 
empirical evidence demonstrating unjust md unequal treatment in the criminal justice system of 
Africm Americms md ... Latinos"); Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and 
Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 13, I5-I9 (1998). 
II2. ROBERTS, supra note 101; Sheri Bonstelle & Christine Schessler, Alijourning Justice: 
New York State's Failure to Support Assigned Counsel Violates the Rights of Families in Child 
Abuse and Neglect Proceedings, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. Il5I, I207 (2001) ("Current child 
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disproportionately populate the criminal justice system. 113 The criminalization of 
neglect thus combines two administrative systems that are notorious for their disparate 
treatment of people of color. 
Given the escalation in parental prosecutions and its disproportionate impact on 
poor women of color, it is incumbent upon criminal courts to examine the 
constitutionality of the procedures they follow when they seek to separate a parent 
from her child. 114 
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF A PARENT TO CARE FOR HER CHllDllS 
The Supreme Court has consistently used sweeping language to describe the 
fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care of their children. 116 
welfare policy undeniably affects significantly more black and Hispanic families than white 
ones. Black parents are far more likely than white parents to be reported for abuse and neglect, 
even when their children exhibit similar symptoms, and authorities are twice as likely to remove 
a black child from home than a white child after a confirmed report of abuse or neglect." 
(citation omitted)). 
113. MICHAEL TONRY,MAL!GNNEGLECT:RACE,CRIME,ANDPuN!SHMENTINAMERICA(l995) 
(describing black overrepresentation in all aspects of the criminal justice system); Davis, supra 
note Ill, at 16 n.l 0; Michael Tonry & Matthew Melewski, The Malign Effects of Drug and 
Crime Control Policies on Black Americans, 37 CRIME & JusT. I, 1-2 (2008). 
114. The Supreme Court has suggested that courts should be particularly concerned with 
potential constitutional violations that affect "discrete and insular minorities" who may not be 
adequately protected by the political process. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 
U.S. 144, 153 n.4 ( 1938); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 73-104 (1980) (arguing that judicial review should be used in cases where the 
democratic process has failed and focusing on the situations in n.4 of Carolene Products as 
prime examples). 
115. This paper focuses largely on the impact of criminal orders of protections on parental 
rights. This is not to suggest, however, that children do not also have a constitutional interest at 
stake in the issuance of orders of protection. Children have been found to have a separate but 
related interest in preserving their family integrity. E.g., Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 
825 (2d Cir. 1977) ("This right to the preservation of family integrity encompasses the 
reciprocal rights of both parent and children. It is the interest of the parent in the 
companionship, care, custody, and management ofhis or her children, and of the children in not 
being dislocated from the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily 
association with the parent." (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). For a more 
detailed discussion of the effect that the criminalization of neglect has had upon children, see 
Vreeland, supra note 4. 
116. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 ( 1972) ("It is plain that the interest of a parent in 
the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children 'come[ s] to this Court 
with a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from 
shifting economic arrangements.'") (internal citation omitted); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 
205, 232 (1972) (''The history and culture ofWestern civilization reflect a strong tradition of 
parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary role of the 
parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring 
American tradition."); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ("It is cardinal with us 
that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function 
and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder." (citing 
Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925))). 
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The Court has described the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, 
and management of his or her children as "[ f]ar more precious ... than property rights" 
and "more significant and priceless than 'liberties which derive merely from shifting 
economic arrangements.'"117 While a permanent termination of parental rights is "'a 
unique kind of deprivation"' 118 because it can cut off forever a parent's right to care 
for her child, temporary child custody decisions still "infringe that fundamental liberty 
interest."119 Because a parent's interest in caring for her child is "deeply rooted in this 
Nation's history and tradition," 120 it is protected by both the substantive and procedural 
components of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 121 As a result, it is 
necessary to evaluate the criminal courts' practice of issuing orders of protection that 
separate parents from their children according to both tracks of analysis. 122 
A. Unfettered Discretion and Substantive Due Process 
Substantive due process "forbids the government to infringe certain 'fundamental' 
liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is 
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest."123 Because the Court has found 
that the state has a compelling interest in protecting children from harm, 124 substantive 
due process is not an absolute bar to governmental interference with custody. Instead, 
state actions that infringe on parents' ability to care for their children, such as the 
issuance of protective orders, are subject to strict scrutiny to ensure that they restrict 
parental rights no more than is necessary to promote the child's welfare.125 
117. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of Durham County, N.C., 452 U.S. 18,38 (1981) 
(internal citations omitted). 
118. Santoskyv. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 759 (1982) (quoting Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27). 
119. !d.; see supra note 10. 
120. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977). 
121. E.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720(1997)("1n a longlineofcases, we 
have held that, in addition to the specific freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, the 'liberty' 
specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes the rights ... to direct the education and 
upbringing of one's children .... " (citations omitted)); Kia P. v. Mcintyre, 2 F. Supp. 2d 281, 
290 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) ("The liberty interests of parent and child in continued care and 
companionship has both procedural as well as substantive elements."). 
122. Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153,236-46 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (utilizing both 
procedural and substantive due process analysis to evaluate New York City's practice of 
removing children of battered women from their mother's custody). 
123. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993) (emphasis in original). 
124. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584,602--03 (1979) ("Our jurisprudence historically has 
reflected Western civilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental authority over 
minor children .... Nonetheless, we have recognized that a state is not without constitutional 
control over parental discretion in dealing with children when their physical or mental health is 
jeopardized."); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944) ("[T]he family itself is 
not beyond regulation in the public interest ... [a]nd neither rights of religion nor rights of 
parenthood are beyond limitation. Acting to guard the general interest in youth's well being, the 
state as parens patriae may restrict the parent's control ... [T]he state has a wide range of 
power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things affecting the child's welfare."). 
125. Seal v. Morgan, 229 F.3d 567, 574 (6th Cir. 2000) ("Government actions that burden 
the exercise of those fundamental rights or liberty interests are subject to strict scrutiny, and will 
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Laws that vest judges with unfettered discretion to issue orders of protection that 
separate parents from their children cannot survive the strict scrutiny associated with 
substantive due process analysis. The Supreme Court has explained that there is "little 
doubt that the Due Process Clause would be offended if a State were to attempt to 
force the breakup of a natural family, over the objections of the parents and their 
children, without some showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was 
thought to be in the children's best interest."126 
While the state's interest in protecting children from harm is compelling, order of 
protection statutes that grant judges limitless discretion to separate parents from their 
children are simply too broad to withstand strict scrutiny. 127 Legislatures may justly be 
concerned that judges will fail to issue protective orders when they are warranted. 
There is little evidence, however, that requiring judges to evaluate the danger to the 
child will result in the erroneous denial of a significant number of protective orders. 
Indeed, given the emotional and physical risks associated with forcibly removing a 
child from his home, the state's interest in protecting children actually may be 
furthered by restricting judges' discretion to separate parents from their children. 128 
Accordingly, statutes that authorize orders of protection without providing any 
limitations on judicial discretion violate the substantive due process component of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
B. Unfettered Discretion and Procedural Due Process 
Procedural due process requires the government to implement procedures that 
deprive a person of life, liberty, or property in a fair manner. 129 In Lassiter v. 
be upheld only when they are narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental interest."); 
Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 245 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) ("Thus, where the fundamental right of a 
parent against state interference is pitted against society's equally fundamental obligation to 
protect the innocent and vulnerable from harm, some flexibility is required to prevent deadlock. 
But there are degrees of parental rights and degrees of state interest. If the centrality of the 
mother-child relationship--custody-is being challenged, then the state's interest must be 
subject to strict justification. The state must demonstrate that its policy of separation really is 
needed to protect the child."). 
126. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246,255 (1978) (quoting in part Smith v. Org. ofFoster 
Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 862-63 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
127. See Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 245 ("If the centrality of the mother-child 
relationship--custody-is being challenged, then the state's interest must be subject to strict 
justification. The state must demonstrate that its policy of separation really is needed to protect 
the child."). 
128. See Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 836 n.40 
(1977) (noting that "the very fact of removal from even an inadequate natural family is often 
traumatic for the child"); Theo Liebmann, What's MISsing From Foster Care Reform? The Need 
for Comprehensive, Realistic, and Compassionate Removal Standards, 28 HAMuNE J. PuB. L. & 
PoL 'y 141, 148 (2006) (describing the need to account for the harm caused to children by being 
removed from their home); Michael S. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" 
Children: Standards for Removal of Children from Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of 
Children in Foster Care, and Termination of Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REv. 623, 644-45 
(1976). 
129. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987). 
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Department of Social Services and subsequently in Santosky v. Kramer, the Supreme 
Court evaluated the fundamental fairness of state procedures affecting parental rights 
by employing the traditional three-factor test established in the seminal procedural due 
process case, Mathews v. Eldridge. 130 Under Mathews v. Eldridge, courts must balance 
( 1) the private interests affected by the proceeding against (2) the risk of error created 
by the state's chosen procedure, and (3) the countervailing governmental interest that 
supports the use of the challenged procedure. 131 Even a cursory review of the process 
by which criminal courts issue orders of protection suggests that vesting criminal court 
judges with complete discretion to separate parents from their children violates 
procedural due process. 
The Supreme Court has held that the private interest at issue-the right of parents to 
care for their children-"'undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful 
countervailing interest, protection. "'132 Moreover, children have an interest in avoiding 
unnecessary interference with their right to remain with their parents.133 As the Court 
explained in Santosky, until the state proves parental unfitness, the child and his 
parents "share a vital interest" in maintaining their relationship.134 
While the government does have a parens patriae interest in protecting children 
alleged to have experienced some form of neglect, the government's interest in a 
completely discretionary process is limited to its interest in avoiding the erroneous 
denial of protective orders that might result from more stringent standards (as well as 
any administrative costs associated with additional procedural protections). This 
interest in a discretionary statutory scheme must be counterbalanced by the state's 
interest in avoiding the issuance of unnecessary protective orders that may not be in the 
best interests ofthe child. 135 
The government, arguably, has an additional prosecutorial interest in preventing 
witness tampering by defendant parents when the child serves as the state's primary 
witness. However, not only is a witness-tampering concern speculative, there is a 
130. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,335 (1976); see also Santoskyv. Kramer, 455 U.S. 
745, 758--68 (1982) (employing Mathews v. Eldridge analysis to evaluate proper evidentiary 
standard for parental rights termination proceedings); Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. ofDurham 
County, N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 31-32 (1981) (employing Mathews v. Eldridge analysis to 
determine whether due process required that states provide free counsel when they sought to 
terminate the custodial rights of indigent parents). 
131. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 
132. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27 (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,651 (1972)). 
133. See Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817,825 (2d Cir. 1977). 
134. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 760 ("At the factfinding, the State cannot presume that a child 
and his parents are adversaries .... [U]ntil the State proves parental unfitness, the child and his 
parents share a vital interest in preventing erroneous termination of their natural relationship."); 
see also Franz v. Lytle, 997 F .2d 784, 792-93 (1Oth Cir. 1993)("However, we must be sensitive 
to the fact that society's interest in the protection of children is, indeed, multifaceted, composed 
not only with concerns about the safety and welfare of children from the community's point of 
view, but also with the child's psychological well-being, autonomy, and relationship to the 
family or caretaker setting."). 
135. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27 ("Since the State has an urgent interest in the welfare of the 
child, it shares the parent's interest in an accurate and just decision."). 
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strong likelihood that the child's testimony will not ultimately be needed as over 90% 
of all criminal cases are resolved by a plea bargain prior to trial. 136 
The risk of error associated with the state's chosen procedure of granting criminal 
court judges total discretion to decide whether a parent can have contact with her child 
is severe. As discussed above, there are powerful political pressures on judges to issue 
orders of protection. By failing to require judges even to consider the need for a 
protective order, current criminal procedures create a significant likelihood that judges 
will issue protective orders that are not necessary to safeguard the welfare of many 
child victims. Furthermore, there is little evidence of a correspondingly significant risk 
that more substantial proof requirements will lead to the erroneous denial of protective 
orders. First, the significant political pressure to issue the orders mitigates against 
erroneous denials. More importantly, for decades, civil family courts have been 
required to make findings of fact by a preponderance of the evidence137 before 
temporarily separating parents from their children. While a number of commentators 
have argued compellingly that the procedural protections afforded to parents in the 
civil context are insufficient, 138 few have alleged that these proof requirements have 
prevented the state from successfully intervening when a child was in danger. 
Procedural due process demands that ''the litigants and the factfinder must know at 
the outset of a given proceeding how the risk of error will be allocated, [and thus] the 
standard of proof necessarily must be calibrated in advance."139 The government's 
significant interest in ensuring that children in need of protective orders receive them 
must be balanced against parents' and children's interest in avoiding an unnecessary 
forced separation. Given the risk that the state's chosen procedure of issuing protective 
orders will lead to a substantial number of children being unnecessarily separated from 
their parents, procedural due process requires that courts make some fmding of danger 
based on a specified standard of proof before a parent can be barred from seeing her 
child. 
Yet if the current procedures vesting judges with unfettered discretion to issue 
protective orders violate parents' constitutional rights, how can criminal courts 
responsibly intervene to protect those children who may be in danger? For too long the 
criminal justice system has conflated child neglect with domestic abuse.140 As a result, 
136. See George Fisher, Plea Bargaining's Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 1012-13 (2000) 
(noting that in modem American courtrooms, "guilty-plea rates above ninety or even ninety-five 
percent are common"). It is likely, given the state's limited punitive interest in prosecuting 
neglectful parents, that criminal neglect cases are even less likely to proceed to trial than other 
misdemeanor criminal cases. 
137. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT§§ 1027, 1048(b) (McKinney 2010). The Family Court 
Act was first enacted in 1962. Family Court Act, 1962 N.Y. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 686 
(McKinney) (codified as amended at N.Y. F AM. CT. ACT (McKinney 2008, 2009, & 201 0)); see 
also Nassau County Dep't of Soc. Servs. ex rei. Miranda H. v. Laquetta H., 595 N.Y.S.2d 97 
(N.Y. Ct. App. 1993) (affirming the family court's finding by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the child was appropriately removed pursuant to§ 1027). 
138. See, e.g., J. Bohl, "Those Privileges Long Recognized": Termination of Parental 
Rights Law, the Family Right to Integrity and the Private Culture of the Family, I CARDOZO 
WOMEN's L.J. 323,368 (1994); Paul Chill, Burden of Proof Begone: The Pernicious Effect of 
Emergency Removal in Child Protective Proceedings, 41 FAM. CT. REv. 457,465 (2003). 
139. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 757. 
140. Cf Suk, supra note 74, at 43-44 (describing the Manhattan District Attorney's 
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criminal courts and prosecutors have adopted procedures developed for domestic 
violence victims that fail to take into account the unique constitutional interests of 
defendant parents. By looking to family court, the institution that has traditionally 
policed child neglect, the criminal justice system can develop procedures that properly 
balance the constitutional interests of parents with the state's legitimate need to protect 
neglected children. 
IV. APPLYING THE LESSONS OF FAMILY COURT TO CRIMINAL ORDERS OF 
PROTECTION 
Family courts have long been criticized for failing to provide the procedural 
protections afforded to defendants in criminal court. 141 It is not surprising, therefore, 
that criminal courts have not naturally looked to family courts for guidance on how to 
safeguard defendants' due process rights. Unlike criminal courts, however, family 
courts have wrestled for decades with the difficulties of balancing parents' 
constitutional rights with the need to safeguard children. By carefully adapting the 
lessons of family court to the criminal arraignment process, criminal courts can better 
develop procedures for issuing orders that protect children while respecting 
defendants' constitutional rights. 
The challenge of importing procedural safeguards from family court to the criminal 
context is no easy task. First, the procedures for temporarily separating parents from 
their children vary significantly from state to state. Second, the procedures themselves 
tend to be complex, often creating two burdens for the state--one to establish the 
family court's jurisdiction over the child and another to control the subsequent decision 
of whether the child will be separated from his or her parent. Finally, while any process 
likely is better than the unfettered discretion afforded criminal court judges to separate 
parents from their children, existing procedures in family court have, themselves, been 
criticized as insufficient to adequately guard against the erroneous removal of children 
from their parents.142 
One option available to states is to adopt measures in criminal courts that mirror the 
particular procedural questions and burdens that a state's family courts use when they 
consider temporarily removing a child from her parent. A more ambitious proposal 
would be to take into account the frequent criticisms leveled at existing family court 
regimes and establish a more stringent burden for the state in criminal court. By 
looking to the standards originally proposed in 1980 by the National Advisory 
Committee for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention ("NAC Standards"), 143 
Manual's inclusion of criminal neglect in its domestic violence protocol). 
141. See, e.g., Martin Guggenheim & Randy Hertz, Reflections on Judges, Juries, and 
Justice: Ensuring the Fairness of Juvenile Delinquency Trials, 33 WAKE FoREST L. REv. 553 
(1998) (criticizing the refusal to grant juveniles in family court a trial by jury); Candra Bullock, 
Note, Low-Income Parents Victimized by Child Protective Services, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. 
POL'Y & L. 1023, 1038-40 (2003) (condemning the Supreme Court's decision in Lassiter v. 
Department of Social Services of Durham County, N.C., and the failure to provide indigent 
parents with free counsel). 
142. See, e.g., Bohl, supra note 138, at 367-68; Chill, supra note 138, at 464. 
143. NAT'L ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, 
STANDARDS FOR 11ffi ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE {1980) (hereinafter NAC 
STANDARDS]. 
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criminal courts are in a position to adopt robust protections for parent defendants. This 
can be achieved with the knowledge that state welfare agencies would retain the ability 
to intervene via family court in cases in which criminal courts failed to act, and the 
agency deemed the child to be in danger. 
A. Moderate Reform: Mirror the State-Specific Family Court Regime 
Criminal courts can, at very little administrative cost, import at least the minimal 
protections that are afforded to parents in family court when the state seeks to remove a 
child from the home. Before a criminal court judge issues an order of protection 
affecting a parent's right to have contact with her child, the judge should be required to 
consider the facts and make findings that mirror the determinations a family court 
judge from the same jurisdiction would have to make to temporarily separate a parent 
from her child. 144 
The adoption of family court procedures would require that criminal courts identify 
both the particular substantive questions that the jurisdictions' family court judges are 
obliged to resolve before temporarily removing a child from her home, as well as the 
standard of proof the family courts use. While "[ e ]ven a temporary separation ... 
triggers constitutional protections,"145 the Supreme Court has not prescribed a specific 
standard of proof for determinations involving temporary interference with parental 
rights. 146 As described below, several commentators have argued that, given the costs 
and benefits of removing a child from his home, the need for removal should be proven 
in family court by "clear and convincing" evidence. 147 While the clear and convincing 
standard may indeed strike the best balance between the need to protect parental rights 
and avoid unnecessary removals and the need to protect children who may be in 
danger, to date, the majority of states have not adopted such a stringent burden. 148 
144. Many jurisdictions have different procedures for "emergency removal" and "temporary 
removal." Compare N.Y. F AM. CT. AcT§ l 024 (McKinney 20 l 0) (authorizing New York law 
enforcement and social service agencies to take a child into protective custody if there is 
imminent danger to the child and insufficient time to follow the procedure for obtaining a court 
order), with N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1028 (McKinney 2010) (providing for a hearing within 
seventy-two hours of an emergency removal and obligating the state to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that there is an imminent risk to the child's life or health). 
Emergency removal procedures are intended to apply in the hopefully rare instance in which 
there is insufficient time to hold a hearing or go to court to obtain an order of removal. See 
Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 167 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). The decision to issue an 
order of protection more closely resembles the temporary removal process given that the safety 
of the child has been temporarily secured, the court has the time and opportunity to evaluate the 
need for continued separation, and the duration of the order can last for months at a time. It is 
the procedures for temporary removal that criminal courts should seek to emulate. 
145. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 235. 
146. See, e.g., In re Juvenile Appeal (83-CD), 455 A.2d 1313, 1323-25 (Conn. 1983) 
(explaining that the proper standard ofprooffor temporary terminations of parental rights is a 
fair preponderance of the evidence while permanent terminations require the clear and 
convincing standard described in Santosky). 
147. E.g., Wai<l, supra note 128, at 654. 
148. Two states presently use a clear and convincing evidence standard. IOWA CODE ANN. § 
232.96 (West 2006); 42 PA. CoNS. STAT. ANN. § 6335 (West 2000). Thirteen states and the 
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The substantive question that family courts must resolve to determine whether or 
not to remove a child from her home also can vary considerably from state to state. 
Some states allow the judge to remove a child from his home if the judge believes, 
based on a certain quantum of proof, that it is in the child's best interests to be 
removed. 149 Other states authorize judges to remove a child only upon a fmding that 
remaining in the home would place the child in imminent danger of harm.150 While 
judges retain considerable discretion over the decision to separate a parent from her 
child in jurisdictions applying the "best interests" standard, the adoption of either test 
by criminal courts would be a positive step toward recognizing that parent defendants 
have an important liberty interest in raising their children. 
Importing the procedural protections that exist in family court into the criminal 
system likely would not require significant structural alterations to most states' 
criminal procedure. The arraignment is an ideal opportunity for criminal court judges 
to make an initial determination as to whether an order of protection is warranted. The 
defendant is already represented by legal counsel, 151 and, because courts generally 
make bail determinations at the arraignment, there exists an opportunity for both sides 
to argue the facts of the case and the strength of the evidence. To adequately protect 
parents' rights, criminal courts need only make explicit the substantive questions the 
judge must resolve and establish a clear standard of proof that puts the burden on the 
state to demonstrate that it is necessary to separate a parent from her child. 
Some might question whether criminal court judges have the necessary experience 
and training to determine whether an order of protection is warranted. As discussed 
above, the New York Division of Criminal Justice Services resisted legislative efforts 
to empower criminal courts to issue protective orders, in part out of concern that 
judges lacked the training to determine when such orders would be appropriate. 152 
District of Columbia currently have a preponderance of the evidence standard. CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN.§ 46b-129(West2009); D.C. CODE§ 16-2317 (Supp. 2009);HAw.REv. STAT.§ 587-
4l(b) (2008); KY. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 620.080(2) (LexisNexis 2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
22, § 4035(2)(Supp. 2009); MAss ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 24 (LexisNexis 2009); NEB. REv. STAT. 
ANN.§ 43-254 (LexisNexis 2005); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 169-C: 13 (2002); N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 
9:6-8.46 (West Supp. 2009); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT§§ 1027, 1046(b) (McKinney 2010); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78A-6-306(9)(a) (2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5308 (Supp. 2009); VA. CODE 
ANN.§ 16.1-252(G)(2003); WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 14-3-405(c)(2009). 
149. ARK. CODE ANN.§ 9-27-328(b) (2009); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 19-3-508(2) (West 
2009); HAw. REv. STAT.§ 587-53(c)(Supp. 2008); lDAHOCODEANN. § 16-1615(5)(e)(2009); 
IND. CODE§ 31-34-19-6 (LexisNexis 2007); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 29C (LexisNexis 
2009); MISS. CODE ANN.§ 43-21-301(4)(c) (West 2008); MONT. CODE ANN.§ 41-3-432(5)(b) 
(2009); NEV. REv. STAT.§ 432B.480(l)(b)(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2007); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT 
§!052(b)(i)(A) (MCKINNEY 2010); OR. REV. STAT.§ 419B.l85(d) (2009); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 13.34.130 (West Supp. 2010); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-426(c) (2009). 
150. DEL. FAM. CT. C.P.R. 212(b); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 39.402(1) (West Supp. 2010); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 38-2243(£) (Supp. 2009); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 4034(2) (2004); OKLA. 
STAT. tit. lOA,§ l-4-203(A)(l) (2009); W.VA. CODE ANN.§ 49-6-3(c) (LexisNexis 2009). 
151. Brewerv. Williams, 430 U.S. 387,398 (1977)("Whateverelseitmaymean, therightto 
counsel granted by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments means at least that a person is entitled 
to the help of a lawyer at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated against 
him-whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or 
arraignment." (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
152. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
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Judges, however, already have the discretion to issue protective orders. The fact that 
criminal court judges may not be competent to determine whether a child is in danger 
does not necessarily support granting judges the unfettered discretion to issue those 
orders. Without any clear legal standard to follow, criminal court judges reflexively 
issue protective orders without any examination of the need for the order and without 
weighing that need against the parent's interest in continuing to care for her child. 
Moreover, given the emotional and physical risks associated with forcibly removing a 
child from his home, it is not at all clear that a rule eliminating all hurdles to issuing 
protective orders is even in the child's best interests.153 
Nor should one assume that requiring judges to consider the appropriateness of 
issuing an order that separates parents from their children will necessarily result in a 
substantial decrease in the number of orders issued. As discussed above, in the 
domestic violence context, the New York legislature sought to require judges to issue 
opinions explaining their decision whether or not to issue an order of protection as a 
way to encourage the use of such orders. 154 Given the powerful political pressure on 
judges to issue orders of protection, 155 the relatively low evidentiary standards 
employed in family court should not unduly hamper the state's efforts to protect 
children who truly are in need of protection. 
Finally, regardless of its ultimate impact on the number of protective orders issued, 
the state always can seek to use well-established family court procedures to remove a 
child whom authorities believe to be in danger. Importing a standard of proof and a 
fact-fmding process into the criminal context simply prevents the state from bypassing 
those procedural protections that traditionally have been required in the civil context 
when the state seeks to protect a neglected child from his parents. 
Admittedly, current procedural safeguards in family court are far from perfect. 
Numerous commentators have argued that a variety of factors increase the likelihood 
that judges and other governmental actors (police, social workers, government 
attorneys, etc.) will unnecessarily separate children from their parents. 156 These factors 
include the tendency of such government actors to base removal determinations on the 
fear of job discipline, their own civil or criminal liability, or the fear of negative 
publicity resulting from the serious injury of a child left with or returned to his or her 
parents. 157 Similarly, parents' lack of sophistication with the legal process and the 
broad and ambiguous statutory definitions authorizing the temporary and permanent 
termination of parental rights contribute to an increased risk that children will be taken 
153. See Smith v. Org. ofFoster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816,836-37 n.40 
( 1977) ("[T]he very fact of removal from even an inadequate natural family is often traumatic 
for the child."); Liebmann, supra note 128 (describing the need to account for the harm caused 
to children by their removal from their home); Wald, supra note 128, at ~6. 
154. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text. 
155. SeesupraParti.D. 
156. See supra Part II. 
157. Chill, supra note 138, at 460--61. A study conducted by the National Center on Child 
Abuse and Neglect found that investigators were more than twice as likely to incorrectly 
"substantiate" a false charge of child abuse or neglect than they were to erroneously find a 
legitimate charge to be "unfounded." MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT'S WRONG wrrn CHILoREN'S 
RIGHfS 194 (2005) (citing NATIONAL CENTER ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, STUDY OF 
NATIONAL INCIDENCE AND PREVALENCE OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 5-6 (1988)). 
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erroneously from their parents.158 Finally, some critics argue that existing standards fail 
to adequately compensate for the tendency of judges and social workers to 
underestimate the harm associated with removing a child from her parent and placing 
her in foster care. 159 
Yet while current safeguards in family court may themselves be less than fully 
adequate, they are not without value. First, while some might argue that the burden of 
proof the government must satisfy to remove a child from her parents is too low, 160 
even a minimal burden requires the judge to make findings that can then be reviewed 
by a higher court. More importantly, the value ofholding a hearing focused directly on 
the issue of whether the state should interfere with a parent's relationship with her child 
should not be underestimated. While family courts may ignore the long-term 
implications of"temporary" custody decisions, those judges are at least forced to take 
responsibility for their decisions to remove children from their homes. In the criminal 
system, the abrogation of parental rights is currently a mere byproduct of a procedure 
focused on separating defendants from complaining witnesses. By failing to recognize 
the fundamental differences between typical defendants and parent defendants, 
criminal courts not only ignore the constitutional interests affected by orders of 
protection, they avoid squarely examining the ramifications of an order that bars a 
parent from seeing her child. 
B. Ambitious Reform: Adopt the NAC Standards for Removal 
In 1974, Congress passed the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act. 161 
As part of the Act's effort to reduce juvenile crime, the National Advisory Committee 
for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention was established to advise policy 
makers and to develop national standards for the administration of juvenile justice.162 
In 1980, the committee submitted its report to Congress proposing detailed standards 
and strategies for states to use when they intervene in children's lives. 163 
The standards proposed by the committee to govern the removal of children due to 
neglect or abuse represented a radical departure from existing state practices. While 
acknowledging the need to intervene to protect children from harm, the report 
explained that it was "clear that in too many instances, intervention has resulted in 
prolonged, often multiple out-of-home placements when less drastic alternatives could 
have provided as good or better protection."164 In a conscious effort to limit judicial 
discretion, the committee proposed authorizing judges to separate children from their 
parents only if the court made three critical findings. First, the court had to find that the 
158. Wald, supra note 128, at 628-29; Michael Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of 
"Neglected" Children: A Search for Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REv. 985, 1000-04 
(1975). 
159. Seesupranote 128. 
160. See, e.g., Chill, supra note 138, at 464. 
161. Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Actofl974, Pub. L. No. 93-415,88 Stat. 
1109 (1974) (codified as amended principally at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5601-72). 
162. NACSTANDARDS,supranote 143. 
163. !d. 
164. !d. § 2.13 Commentary. 
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child had experienced one of nine specific harms. 165 Second, the court had to find that 
there was clear and convincing evidence that the child could not adequately be 
protected from further neglect and abuse unless the child were removed from the 
home. 166 Finally, the court was obliged to find that the alternative placement was less 
likely to be damaging to the child than remaining in the home.167 
The NAC Standards envision a system radically different from the absolute 
discretion possessed by criminal court judges to issue protective orders. They are, in 
fact, far more restrictive than the procedures that exist in the majority of state family 
165. /d. § 3.113. The NAC standards identify nine distinct "harms" that justify family court 
jurisdiction over neglect and abuse cases. According to § 3.113, jurisdiction is appropriate in 
cases involving: 
a. Juveniles who are unable to provide for themselves and who have no parent, 
guardian, relative, or other adult with whom they have substantial ties willing and 
able to provide supervision and care; 
b. Juveniles who have suffered or are likely to suffer physical injury inflicted 
nonaccidentally by their parent, guardian, or primary caretaker, which causes or 
creates a substantial risk of death, disfigurement, impairment of bodily function, or 
bodily harm; 
c. Juveniles who have been sexually abused by their parents, guardian, primary 
caretaker, or a member of the household; 
d. Juveniles whose physical health is seriously impaired or is likely to be seriously 
impaired as a result of conditions created by their parents, guardian, or primary 
caretaker, or by the failure of such persons to provide adequate supervision and 
protection; 
e. Juveniles whose emotional health is seriously impaired and whose parents, 
guardian, or primary caretaker fail to provide or cooperate with treatment; 
f. Juveniles whose physical health is seriously impaired because of the failure of 
their parents, guardian, or primary caretaker to supply them with adequate food, 
clothing, shelter or health care, although financially able or offered the means to 
do so; 
g. Juveniles whose physical health has been seriously impaired or is likely to be 
seriously impaired or whose emotional health has been seriously impaired because 
their parents have placed them for care or adoption, in violation of the law, with an 
agency, an institution, a nonrelative, or a person with whom they have no 
substantial ties; 
h. Juveniles who are committing acts of delinquency as a result of pressure from or 
with the approval of their parents, guardian, or primary caretaker; and 
i. Juveniles whose parents, guardian, or primary caretaker prevent them from 
obtaining the education required by law. 
/d. 
166. /d.§ 3.184. 
167. /d. The NAC standards were very similar to standards proposed a few years earlier by 
the Institute of Judicial Administration and the American Bar Association ("IJAIABA 
standards"). The chief difference between the two proposals was the inclusion of different 
standards of proof under the IJA/ ABA standards based upon whether the case involved abuse or 
neglect. The National Advisory Committee determined that it was unnecessary to include a 
lower standard of evidence (preponderance) for abuse cases because both the danger and the 
inadequacy of alternative safeguards are easier to prove in such cases. /d. § 3.184 Commentary. 
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courts today. Nonetheless, there are compelling reasons for criminal courts to adopt the 
NAC Standards when they consider separating a parent from her child. 
First, the NAC Standards provide substantially more protection for parents' liberty 
interest in having contact with their children than most existing family court regimes. 
While the Supreme Court has never determined the appropriate test for temporarily 
separating a parent from her child, it is clear that such a separation can be grievously 
traumatic. Most family court regimes have remained largely unchanged since the 1980s 
when the National Advisory Committee charged that then-existing family court 
procedures allowed for far too many instances of unnecessary separation when lesser 
interventions would have sufficed. 168 It therefore may be appropriate to heighten the 
standards for removal in order to adequately protect what has been recognized as a 
parent's fundamental right to have contact with her child. 
Second, given the considerable political pressure on criminal court judges to 
separate parent defendants from their children, 169 the higher standard of proof and the 
clearly delineated substantive categories of harm proposed by the National Advisory 
Committee can provide cover for judges who may believe that the circumstances of a 
given case do not justify abrogating a parent's rights. 
Third, by explicitly requiring courts to consider the potential harm caused by the 
alternative placement, criminal court judges are more likely to reflect on the full 
implications of their decision and take into account some of the costs of removal that 
are often ignored when judges consider issuing protective orders. 
Finally, criminal courts can adopt the more stringent NAC Standards secure in the 
knowledge that the state can always pursue removal in family court. The diversion of 
cases to family court is likely to benefit both the child and the defendant as family 
courts, unlike criminal courts, have access to an array of social services intended to 
support the integrity of families. Indeed, the National Advisory Committee justified 
raising the standard of proof to "clear and convincing" in part on the basis that a higher 
standard would encourage the use of alternative support services that have the potential 
to protect children while keeping families whole.170 
CONCLUSION 
Criminal court judges' unfettered discretion to separate parents from their children 
cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court's recognition that a parent has a 
fundamental liberty interest in caring for her child. 171 The expansion of the criminal 
law into the home has been justly praised for helping to combat the scourge of 
domestic violence. 172 As criminal law extends its reach deeper into the private sphere, 
168. !d. § 2.13 Commentary; see supra text accompanying note 164. 
169. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
170. NAC STANDARDS, supra note 143, § 3.184 Commentary ("It is anticipated that the 
requirement for [the clear and convincing standard] will help to direct attention to the need for 
nonremoval alternatives."). 
171. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57,65 (2000)("The liberty interest at issue in this case-
the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children-is perhaps the oldest of 
the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court."). 
172. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CoNN. L. REv. 973,973-
74 (1991) (praising the efforts of the battered women's movement for bringing domestic 
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however, criminal procedure must evolve to recognize the constitutional protections 
that safeguard those relationships the state seeks to regulate. 
The criminal justice system's foray into policing neglect may well be ill advised. 
Criminal courts are designed to punish offenders for specific transgressions, not to 
rehabilitate families. 173 Unlike family courts, criminal courts lack the ability to provide 
the services and long term monitoring that family courts routinely utilize to protect 
children and preserve at-risk families. 174 The criminalization of neglect also may deter 
parents and neighbors from seeking state assistance when families are in crisis.175 
The wisdom of using the criminal justice system to police neglect ultimately is a 
decision for policy makers. If, however, the system continues to criminally prosecute 
parents for neglect, it must do so in a way that comports with due process. The 
procedures for issuing orders of protections that were once justified by the challenges 
of fighting domestic violence cannot constitutionally be applied to parents charged 
with criminal neglect. Moreover, the disparate impact that this practice has upon poor 
women of color further undermines the authority of a judicial system already weakened 
by accusations of race and class bias. 176 By looking to the family court system, either 
by adopting existing procedural safeguards or using the proposals outlined by the 
National Advisory Committee, criminal courts can identify proper standards for 
determining when it is permissible to bar a parent from seeing her child. The adoption 
of such standards not only will vindicate important constitutional interests, it will 
ultimately promote the welfare of the children the system seeks to protect. 
violence into the public domain); Suk, supra note 74, at 5-6 ("During the period of over thirty 
years in which the criminalization of domestic violence has been in the making, feminists have 
sought to recast as 'public' matters previously considered 'private.' ... This reform effort has 
met with remarkable and transformative success."). 
173. Vreeland, supra note 4, at 1072 (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 1.05(5) (McKinney 1998)) 
(explaining that the purpose of the penal law is to provide "an appropriate public response to 
particular offenses"). 
174. /d. at 1068 ("The family court is a rehabilitative setting that aims to identifY families in 
crisis, protect the parties in danger and provide services to the family."). 
175. /d. at 1084 (citing Ilze Betins, Child Welfare Doesn't Belong in Police Hands, N.Y. 
TIMEs, Oct. 30, 1997, at A30) (warning that the arrests of neglectful parents will discourage 
parents from reaching out for help when they need it). 
176. See, e.g.,DAVIDCOLE,NoEQuALJUSTICE:RACEANDCIASSINrnEAMERlCANCRiMJNAL 
JusTICE SYSTEM (1999) (arguing that race and class bias are endemic to the criminal justice 
system); CORAMAE RICHEY MANN, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: A QUESTION OF COLOR ( 1993) (detailing 
discrimination in the criminal justice system against African-Americans, Asian-Americans, 
Hispanic-Americans, and Native Americans); Davis, supra note 111, at 17 (identifYing 
prosecutorial discretion as "a major cause of racial inequality in the criminal justice system"). 
